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VOTING RIGHTS DEBATE
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Thank you, Professor Shaw. That brings to a conclusion the
first two segments of the program. For the next segment, I turn
matters back to Judge Lazer.
Judge Leon D. Lazer:
The next portion of today's session is going to be a debate
relative to minority districts. The question of creating districts
especially constituted according to proportion of residents or
racial minority voters, in order to assure the election of a
minority person as a legislator, is a controversial one. The
Supreme Court has decided two cases this year that are closely
related to this issue,1 and we have two very distinguished
speakers who will disagree, as to the decisions, as well as to the
implications of the Constitution, the Voting Rights Act,
2 and
1. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). In Shnv, the Court found
that an Equal Protection claim was stated where the state legislature created
two majority-black districts in such a way that the reapportionment scheme can
only be seen as an effort to racially segregate voters into "separate voting
districts." Id. at 2832; Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993). The
Court noted that the Voting Rights Act does not prohibit the formation of
majority-black districts per se, but merely focuses on the results of
apportionment. Id. at 1152.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1986). Subsection (a) states in relevant part:
No voting qualification ... or standard, practice, or procedure shall be
imposed by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results
in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote on account of race or color... ; (b) A violation of subsection
(a)... is established if,... shown that the political processes leading
to... election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open
to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by
subsection (a) ....
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c). Subsection (c) states in relevant part:
Whenever a State or political subdivision ... shall enact... any voting
qualification ... , or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to
voting different from that in force... on November 1, 1964.... such
State or subdivision may institute an action for a declaratory judgment
415
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other like statutes3 as they relate to this issue. I am going to set
certain ground rules here. Each speaker will speak for twenty
minutes, and will be followed by a ten-minute rebuttal. Mr.
Ralston shall speak first, followed by Mr. Carvin.
Mr. Carvin, whom I just mentioned, was an important member
of the United States Attorney General's office during the Reagan
Administration. He is presently a partner in the law firm of
Shaw, Pitman, Potts & Trawbridge in Washington, D.C..
Starting from 1983, and up to 1988, he worked for the federal
government, and for two of those years, he was the Deputy
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division
of the Department of Justice, serving under Bradford Reynolds, 4
who was then in charge of that division. Many controversial
decisions were made and positions taken during that time, and
Mr. Carvin played an important role in the running of that
department.
Apart from his position in the Civil Rights Division, he also
played a role in the Department of Justice, by working in the
Office of Legal Counsel, which was responsible for advising all
of the litigating divisions of the Department of Justice on how to
handle legal matters. Indeed, he is a very distinguished lawyer,
with a very distinguished background, having graduated from
George Washington University Law Center, which is called the
National Law Center. He is affiliated with many organizations,
including the Washington, D.C. Chapter of the Federalist
Society. I could say a lot more about him, but I think time is a
factor for us.
Taking what I am sure will be a different position, is Charles
Stephen Ralston, who has spent a very long and distinguished
that such. . . practice, or procedure does not have the... effect of
denying... the right to vote on account of race or color ....
Id.
3. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(1) (1986). Subsection (a)(1) states in
relevant part: "All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by
law to vote ... shall be entitled and allowed to vote ... without distinction of
race, color .... " Id.
4. William Bradford Reynolds was the Assistant Attorney General of the
Justice Department during the Reagan Administration.
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career, spanning almost thirty years, in working with the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF). Indeed, he
has risen in that office, from Assistant Counsel, way back in
1964, to Deputy Director Counsel. He was a director of the LDF
San Francisco office, and then, First Assistant Counsel. He is
presently a senior staff attorney in that office. He has lectured
and written a great deal,5 and he has argued, of course, before
the Supreme Court. At our first conference, in 1989, during
which year, several decisions of major civil rights importance
came down, we had the pleasure of hearing from Mr. Ralston.
Thus, we now have before us two very important and
knowledgeable lawyers in the civil rights area. Based on the toss
of coin, I am going to ask Mr. Ralston to speak first.
Mr. Charles Stephen Ralston, Esq.:
Thank you, Judge Lazer. I am pleased to be here again. The
last time I was here, I had the chance to talk about the Supreme
Court disasters which occurred in the spring of 1989.6 At that
time, I mentioned that a bill to overturn those decisions was
circulating in Congress. Since then, Congress has passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. 7 Today, I will talk about another
decision that, from the LDF's point of view, was something of a
Supreme Court disaster. I live in the hope that I may come here
someday, to speak about United States Supreme Court decisions
with which we, at the LDF, actually agree. In the mean time, the
main case we are going to discuss today is the Supreme Court
case, Shaw v. Reno,8 which has already had a major impact. 9 I
5. See, e.g., Charles Stephen Ralston, Court vs. Congress: 
Judicial
Interpretation of the Civil Rights Acts and Congressional Response, 8 YALE L.
& POL'Y REv. 205 (1991) (discussing the struggle between the Supreme Court
and Congress over interpretation and enforcement of Civil Rights Acts of 1866
and 1964).
6. See Charles Stephen Ralston, Symposium, Employment
Discrimination, 6 TouRo L. REv. 55 (1989).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991).
8. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
9. Id.; see also Peter Applebome, Suits Challenging Redrawn Districts
that Help Blacks, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 14, 1994, at Al ("[Newly created black
1994] 417
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will also talk about some other Supreme Court cases from last
Term which deal with voting rights issues. 10
In the interest of full disclosure, I have to mention the fact that
the LDF fied an amicus brief in support of the district in Shaw.
Since the case has been remanded to the District Court in North
Carolina, we have intervened in the case on behalf of both white
and black voters. I am one of the attorneys representing
defendant interveners in the case, trying to defend the district
which was developed, and which was the subject matter of the
Supreme Court's decision. 11 So, in today's debate, I am going to
give you the perspective of a litigator on one side of the case,
discuss how that case should go, and exactly what the Supreme
Court's goal seems to be, which, I might add, is not clear at this
point. I will do this, hopefully, without giving away any secrets
of how we hope to win the case.
Again, I should explain that the Supreme Court decided three
voting rights cases last Term. The first two cases were
noncontroversial in outcome, and not particularly upsetting to
those of us who do civil rights litigation. The first one was a case
called Growe v. Emerson,12 which held that a federal court
should allow state, and, in appropriate cases, local courts,
congressional districts face a rising tide of court challenges," stemming from
Shaw v. Reno.); Susan B. Glasser, Members Mobilize to Fight Map Suits,
ROLL CALL, Feb. 24, 1994. Congressional Black Caucus "launching an
unprecedented effort to head off lawsuits" started in the wake of Shaw v.
Reno's challenge to new majority-black districts. Id.
10. See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1085 (1993) (holding
that district court erred in not deferring to state court's efforts to redraw
Minnesota's state legislative and federal congressional districts); Voinovich v.
Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1156 (1993) (holding section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 contains no per se prohibitions against particular types of
districts).
11. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2833. The Appendix to the majority opinion in
this case is a map of all electoral districts within North Carolina. This map
indicates that the central focus of this case is a district which begins in the
southwest portion of the state, and continues, passing through ten other
districts, in a seemingly arbitrary, winding stretch towards the North Central
portion of the state. The district seems to be anything but compact in a
geographical manner. Id.
12. 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993).
418 [Vol 10
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officials and redistricting commissions, the first opportunity to
try to redistrict and correct the problems that might exist, rather
than to jump in prematurely with its own plan. 13 Basically, this
holding is consistent with previous Supreme Court decisions,
14
and seems to make particularly good sense. Growe was a
unanimous decision written by Justice Scalia. Although I do not
often agree with Justice Scalia, I found myself in agreement with
this decision.
The second case was Voinovich v. Quilter,15 which was a
challenge to redistricting in Ohio, and in which, an amicus brief
was filed by the Defense Fund. 16 In Voinovich, the Supreme
Court again clarified the role of the federal court in striking down
redistricting carried out by Ohio, 17 and declared that, under the
Voting Rights Act, the state could voluntarily create majority-
minority districts. Therefore, a federal court should not substitute
its judgment as to appropriate districting, without first
establishing that a violation of the act has occurred. 18 However,
13. Id. at 1081. In reaching this holding, the Growe Court reiterated the
Illinois events of 1965-66 that gave rise to the litigation of the same issue in
Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965) (per curiam). The Scott decision
clearly indicated that state governments should have a primary and fair
opportunity to validly redistrict their electoral districts, and that federal courts
should stay themselves from proceeding in such cases, due to the uniquely
political nature of the issues involved in redistricting plans. Scott, 381 U.S. at
409. The Growe Court also reasoned that the Federal Constitution provides
that states retain the right to control their own apportionment plans for federal,
state and local elections, and that unless there is reason to believe a state will
fail to fairly provide its citizens an opportunity to participate in elections, there
is no reason for a federal court to interfere with the state court's and
legislature's proceedings. Growe, 113 S. Ct. at 1080-81.
14. See, e.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975) (finding that state
branches are responsible for reapportionment); Scott, 381 U.S. at 409 (stating
that the federal court must defer to a state's legislative and judicial branches).
15. 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993).
16. Id. at 1157 (holding that to prevail on a dilution claim under section 2
of Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, the state's
apportionment plan must adversely affect the protected class' voting strength).
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the Supreme Court noted that there was no claim in that case that
the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional. We found this a little
sinister because there were potentially four Justices on the Court
ready to hold that at least a part of the Voting Rights Act may be
unconstitutional. Shaw then came along, and that was the
blockbuster of the Term.
Shaw arose in North Carolina, a state that is covered by section
5 of the Voting Rights Act. 19 Because a large number of counties
are under the jurisdiction of section 5, statewide redistricting has
to go to the Department of Justice for approval. 20 In light of the
1990 Census, the entire country had to be redistricted. 2 1 The
issue in Shaw was the redrawing of the line for the North
Carolina congressional delegations.
22
After the 1990 Census, North Carolina had twelve members in
the House of Representatives. The voting age population of
North Carolina was 78% white and 20% African-American. 2 3
Since Reconstruction, the state had not sent an African-American
to Congress. As the General Assembly set out to redistrict the
state for upcoming elections, it had to contend with the Voting
19. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, officially known as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(c), provides that states and political subdivisions that have been found
to be subject to the provisions of section 4, also known as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(b), must submit any plans to alter voter qualifications, standards and all
voting procedures to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, and receive a declaratory judgment from that court, which states
that the submitted plan does not deny or abridge voting rights on the basis of
color or race. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1986).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c), or section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
alternatively provides that an appropriate state official might submit proposed
voting procedure changes to the Attorney General, and obtain approval of such
plans within sixty days of submission. Because many states and political
subdivisions fall under the control of 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b), or section 4 of the
Voting Rights Act, a large number of states may opt for the faster approval of
the Department of Justice, of which the Attorney General is the head.
21. C. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2819.
22. Id. at 2824. Specifically at issue was the redrawing of two
controversial majority-minority districts, at least one of which was so contorted
in shape that there could be no possible justification for its formation, other
than to unite the votes of those who were contained within it. Id.
23. Id. at 2820.
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Rights Act, and the concepts of fairness in voting that this act
underscores. 2 4 A major case on this issue that defined the 1982
amendments to the Voting Rights Act, was Thornburg v.
Gingles,25 which my office also handled, and which involved the
redistricting of the North Carolina State Legislature. 26 Gingles
held that the Voting Rights Act had been violated, and required
redistricting which would result in a significant number of
African-American representatives in the state legislature.27 The
congressional plan with which North Carolina came up with in
1991, and which, interestingly enough, was developed with the
24. Id. The Shaw Court referred to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, which is actually an amendment to the original 1965 statute, enacted to
require that those jurisdictions which are subject to its regulation obtain federal
permission prior to changing their voting "standard, practice or procedure." 42
U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1986).
25. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Gingles only examined the statutory issues
involved with this Voting Rights Act claim. The Gingles Court affirmed the
district court's finding that the legacy of racial discrimination manifest in
voting procedures, requires that the Voting Rights Act properly apply to North
Carolina, and must be utilized to remedy wrongs committed. Id at 80. In
reaching this conclusion, the Gingles Court explained that the purpose of the
Voting Rights Act is to allow mere discriminatory effect of voting procedures,
and not to require a showing of intent, prior to the application of a remedy for
such discrimination. Id at 35, 74.
26. Id. at 38. Specifically, the Gingles case was an action brought by black
citizens, in which they alleged that six multi-member, and one single-member
North Carolina electoral districts were redistricted in such a way as to dilute
their voting power within those districts. Id. The plaintiff-appellees claimed
that sufficient black populations existed within the districts, and contended that
redistricting could have been accomplished in a way that provided for several
black majority districts, while still respecting the requirement that districts be
contiguous. Id. Therefore, the contention was that the failure of the North
Carolina legislature to draw districts in this manner was proof of that state
government's violation of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 35.
27. Id. at 80. Pointing to a history of discrimination in the state, consistent
appeals to racial prejudice within political campaigns, and multi-member
districting schemes that appear to impede black citizens in those districts from
electing their preferred representatives, the Gingles Court held that the limited
and recent success of black political candidates cannot overcome the obvious
dilution of black voting power that the districting plan at issue perpetrated. Id.
Thus, the Gingles Court upheld the district court's conclusion that the multi-
member districts at issue violated the Voting Rights Act. Id.
1994]
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assistance of one of the lead attorneys of the Thornburg case,
created one majority African-American district in one corner of
the state. That plan was submitted to the Department of Justice.
The Department of Justice rejected it on the grounds that, in its
view, it was possible to create a second majority-minority district
in another corner of the state - a district, which it said, was
viable because there could be a coalition between African-
Americans and Native-Americans. Therefore, the Department of
Justice sent the plan back to North Carolina.
The question then was: What was North Carolina to do in light
of, number one, a finding of a violation of section 5,28 and,
number two, the distinct possibility that if it did not do
something, there would be a lawsuit brought under section 2 of
the Act. North Carolina, therefore, created a second majority-
minority district, 29 which, if you look in the appendix of the
Supreme Court decision in Shaw, you will see is very long, and
very skinny. 30 It had been said in the newspapers that if you
drove down the highway that passes through this district, with
both doors opened, you would kill half of the voters in the
district. 31 This, of course, is a slight exaggeration.
What this district did accomplish was to connect the main
urban centers in North Carolina, and by doing so, create a
district that was primarily, African-American. The result of
creating these two districts was to allow African-Americans to
elect representatives to Congress, for the first time in many
years. The delegation, however, was still predominantly white.
28. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act gives district courts the power to
pass on the redistricting plans of specific states and political subdivisions
determined in section 4. The purpose of such a review is to insure that no
denial or abridgment of voting rights is being perpetrated upon portions of the
populations of these electoral units. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b), (c).
29. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2819-20. Despite North Carolina's efforts to avoid
a section 2 claim by creating a second majority-black district, suit was brought
on the equal protection ground that the irregular shape of the district was an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Id.
30. Id. at 2833.
31. Id. at 2821 (citing Joan Biskupic, N.C. Case to Pose Test of Racial
Redistricting; White Voters Challenge Black-Majority Map, WASH. POST, Apr.
20, 1993, at A4).
422 [Vol 10
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In fact, whites would be over-represented in the delegation, since
they had ten out of the twelve members of the House of
Representatives .32
Everything seemed fine as far as the Voting Rights Act was
concerned, but then, an action was filed by a group of white
voters. Although they did not identify themselves as that in the
complaint, but, they were, in fact, white, and the district court
took judicial notice of that fact.33 Some of these white voters
lived in one of these districts, and some of them did not, but all
of them claimed that their rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment had been violated because race had been taken into
account in creating this district, and that race was the cause of its
"bizarre" shape.
3 4
The case was dismissed by the district court, so no evidence
whatsoever was presented, and no answer was filed. The case
reached the Supreme Court purely on the legal question as to
whether the complaint stated a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 35 Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, in a five-four decision, with some very
strong dissents by Justices White, Souter, Blackmun, and
32. Id. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that white voters cannot
complain of discriminatory treatment since they constitute a voting majority in
10 of the 12 districts).
33. Id. at 2824. In Shaw, since the appellants did not claim that the
"reapportionment plan unconstitutionally diluted white voter strength," it was
not necessary to identify their race as white. Id.
34. Id. at 2821. White voters alleged that the districts were created to
constitute a black majority "without regard to any other considerations, such as
compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political
subdivisions with the purpose to create... [d]istricts along racial lines and to
assure the election of two black representatives." Id.
35. Id. Plaintiffs' claim was that the strangely configured electoral district
was formed by the state legislature to provide African-American voters with a
stronger vote in that district, and that such an action violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by drawing distinctions based
on race, without a compelling state interest for so doing, and without providing
the most narrowly tailored solution to an identified problem. Id. Specifically,
the plaintiffs "alleged that the deliberate segregation of voters into separate
districts on the basis of race violated their constitutional right to participate in a
'color-blind' electoral process." Id. at 2824.
1994] 423
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Stevens, 36 found that the complaint did state a claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 37
Now, one very interesting question concerning this case, which
still puzzles me, is exactly what harm did the plaintiffs suffer?
They had not been denied the right to vote. Nor had they been
denied representation as whites, since whites were still over-
represented in the congressional delegation. So, what was the
injury here? Justice O'Connor, in her opinion, slid quickly past
this question of exactly what injury these folks have suffered, and
held that they can raise these constitutional questions, and
challenge the legitimacy of what the legislature had done. 3 8
36. Id. at 2843 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White stated that there was
no cognizable constitutional claim, because no cognizable injury was alleged.
Id. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice
White's dissenting opinion, in stating that "the conscious use of race in
redistricting plan is to deny a particular group equal access to the political
process or to minimize its voting strength unduly." Id. at 2845 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens found no violation of the Equal Protection Clause
occurs when the "majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a
group that lacks .. power because it remains under-represented in the state
legislature." Id. at 2845 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter found no
justification for Court's decision to apply strict scrutiny to this narrow category
of bizarre-shaped district claims, where electoral districting decision always
calls for some consideration of race for legitimate reasons.
37. Id. at 2825. According to the majority opinion, under the Equal
Protection Clause, state legislation that distinguishes citizens on the basis of
race, must further a compelling state interest. Id. Therefore, a redistricting
plan intentionally created to separate voters into different districts on the basis
of race, without sufficient justification is a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 2828. Consequently, the Shaw majority found that North
Carolina's redistricting scheme is so irrational on its face, because it can be
understood only as a racial gerrymander which lacks sufficient justification. Id.
at 2832. Justice O'Connor, who was joined in her opinion by Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, asserted: "We hold only
that, on the facts of this case, plaintiffs have stated a claim sufficient to defeat
the state appellees' motion to dismiss." Id. at 2828.
38. Id. at 2828. Justice O'Connor stated that the harm to the challengers
was the reinforcement of racial stereotypes, and the threat of undermining "our
system of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials that they
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This is another case following what we may, perhaps somewhat
cynically, term as "the universal white standing doctrine," that
the Supreme Court seemed to be developing last Term. Under
this "doctrine," persons who are offended by the fact that race
has been taken into account, seem to have standing to challenge
the districting scheme, simply because they want to live in a
society that is color-blind. We all agree that such would be a
wonderful society to have. Hopefully, some day, all racism will
end, and we will have a color-blind society, in which all of us
shall treat each other the way we should, with no discrimination
of any sort. But to believe that we have already gotten there, or
are even very close, is unrealistic.
The Court sent the case back for trial, with many of these
questions still open. The basic question continues to be: To what
extent can, and should, race be taken into account in constructing
districts - legislative districts, in particular - at all levels of
government,39 since this case implicates not just congressional
delegations, but also state and local legislative bodies. For
example, right after this case came down, a gentleman, who has
been very much involved in litigation involving New York State,
asserted that, under this decision, every governmental body in the
entire State of New York would have to be reapportioned, since
there was a ripple effect from the redistricting under the Voting
Rights Act in New York City. In other words, we would have to
tear everything up, and start all over again. Well, that is a
nightmare for state and local governments, and it puts all
governments in a very difficult position. This dilemma is similar
to the issues behind affirmative action, as well as that in City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,40 a case we discussed when I was
39. Id. at 2832; see also Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct.
2997, 3026 (1990) (stating that use of racial classifications by federal
government in creating redistricting plans need only be substantially related to
an important government interest); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (finding that all state local redistricting plans based on
racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny).
40. 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). The Croson Court held that legislative
action, which seeks to aid minorities, is subject to the very same strict scrutiny
as are actions that seek to discriminate against minorities, because all
1994] 425
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here four years ago. Justice O'Connor has effectively
"Crosonized" redistricting by saying that if you are going to take
race into account, you have to have a basis for doing it; that is,
you have to show a compelling state interest. 4 1
And here is North Carolina, faced, on the one hand, with the
Department of Justice saying its first plan was illegal under
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and on the other hand, with a
very real threat of being found in violation of section 2, in light
of the history of the state in the Gingles decision. The Supreme
Court now says that North Carolina may have chosen wrongly,
and that this lawsuit can proceed. One of the ironies of the
situation is, that after the census, the LDF and other
organizations actually worked with particular states which had
been in violation of the Voting Rights Act in the eighties,
including North Carolina, to see if, instead of having to be sued
all over again, these states could come up with plans that met the
requirements of the Voting Rights Act, and could avoid a
multitude of new litigation.
That whole process was reasonably successful, and now, there
are thirty-nine African-American members of Congress, which is
more than there has ever been. The great majority of these
Congress persons are from majority-minority districts, and all of
them are now going to be open to challenge. Already, there is a
case in Louisiana, involving this issue, which had been filed
before Shaw,42 and another recent challenge in Georgia. 4 3 I
classifications based on race should be equally held to the test of compelling
state interest served by a narrowly-tailored law. Id.
41. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832 ("Race-based districting by our state
legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny.").
42. Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993). The issue in
this case was whether or not a state has the right to establish a "'racial
majority-minority congressional district by racial gerrymandering.'" Id. at
1191. The court agreed with the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno,
that a state is allowed to do so, but "'only if the state does it right.'" Id. But,
in a memorandum decision, the district court held that Louisiana's effort to
redistrict so as to increase the number of black delegates to the House of
Representatives was in contravention of the Voting Rights Act and the
Constitution. Id. at 1199. The court found that Louisiana's redistricting plan
was the product of racial gerrymandering, was not "narrowly tailored to
426 [Vol 10
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submit that the election and presence of the two African-
Americans in Congress, from North Carolina is good for North
Carolina. Furthermore, the presence of members of Congress
who are African-American is good for the country, the
democratic process, and the body politic, because it deals with
the reality of voting in a pluralistic society. Likewise, their
presence also deals with the reality of historic exclusion of
minorities from the political process, and the destabilizing effect
of such exclusion on the political system.
Quite frankly, it seems to me, that the Supreme Court is
functioning in a type of "never-never land," where "color-blind
society" really means one can go to Congress, look around, and
once again, see no person of color. I do not think that that is a
good result, and is one that is not required by the Constitution.
Unfortunately, a hint was dropped like a ton of bricks in the
middle of the Shaw opinion, that if the Voting Rights Act
requires the consideration of race in drawing districts, perhaps
the Voting Rights Act itself is unconstitutional.
If you count up the votes of members of the Court who have
expressed doubts about the constitutionality of parts of the Voting
Rights Act, there are three who have done so: Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in City of Rome v. United States,44 and Justices
further any compelling governmental interest," and was therefore, "null and
void." Id. at 1199.
43. Johnson v. Miller, No. CIV. 194-003 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 1994).
44. 446 U.S. 156 (1980), reh'g denied, 447 U.S. 916 (1980). In City of
Rome, the Supreme Court held that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was an
extension of Congress' power to remedy violations of the Fifteenth
Amendment, and that these laws rightfully included the power to ban a city's
proposed changes in voting structure, even where that city proved their
proposal to be free from discriminatory intent, if the city was located in a state
where there was a history of racially discriminatory voting practices. Id. at
176-77. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, claiming that the plaintiff, City of
Rome, should be able to go forward with its proposed voting structure
changes, because it had proved that the city had not previously discriminated
against blacks, and the suggested changes also would not produce
discriminatory effects. Id. at 218 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist took issue with the Voting Rights Act, in that he felt the Court's
interpretation of this act conferred far too broad power upon Congress in
interfering with the inner workings of municipal governments, and not enough
1994] 427
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Kennedy and Scalia, in a dissent in Houston LawyersAssociation
v. The Attorney General of Texas.45 Since Justice Thomas
basically votes however Justice Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist vote, there are four people who have already either
explicitly or implicitly expressed doubts about the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. How this is all going
to turn out is going to depend, literally, on Justice O'Connor.
Justice White, who has been very good on voting rights issues,
and who dissented in Shaw, has been replaced by Justice
Ginsburg, who, with very few exceptions, has no track record as
a judge in these cases, because these issues do not arise in the
District of Columbia.
So what comes out of all this for a state or local legislative
body, trying to balance concerns about the Voting Rights Act
with what the Supreme Court has now said? The Supreme Court
does not say that you cannot consider race at all. 46 It
acknowledged that in its prior decisions, but not with any great
enthusiasm, I must say. Justice O'Connor is clearly concerned
with this issue, because she keeps coming back to the
"bizarreness" of this district.47 Her view is that it is so bizarre,
that it can only be accounted for by race.
power to the "bailout" provisions that the law provides upon proof of lack of
discriminatory effect. Id. at 221 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
45. 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court "would not
apply Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to vote dilution claims in judicial
elections." Id. at 2382.
46. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825. The Court stated that it had previously held
that "the Fourteenth Amendment requires state legislation that expressly
distinguishes among citizens because of their race, to be narrowly tailored to
further a compelling governmental interest. Id. The Shaw Court also pointed
out that apportionment itself is a procedure in which legislatures necessarily
take factors such as race, and socio-economic and religious diversity of their
constituent populations into consideration. Id. at 2826-27. Therefore, the
majority contends that race is a permissible consideration in voting rights
issues, as it is in other legislation. Id. However, discriminatory apportioning is
not tolerable. Id. It is the difference between providing a fair opportunity to
elect representatives to all, and having a disenfranchising effect on some,
which the majority in Shaw seeks to discern. Id.
47. Id. at 2820-21. In Shaw, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court,
focused much attention on the extremely irregular shape of at least one of the
428 [Vol 10
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Well, that obviously suggests that when a state legislature is
constructing districts, other reasons besides race must be taken
into account. The Supreme Court itself acknowledged that race
is, in fact, taken into account, since it is common knowledge that
census track data contains race data. When districts are being put
together, everyone knows that African-Americans
overwhelmingly vote Democrat. Accordingly, the Republicans
try to stuff as many African-Americans into each district, and the
Democrats try to split them between districts. Indeed, we believe
this happened in North Carolina. In other words, assuming that
Shaw stands for the proposition that if the only harm is race, it is
bad, you have to see what other reasons exist for a district
besides just race. Number one, incumbent protection and partisan
politics are critical as to how districts actually come out. Number
two, aside from race, there does exist a community of interest
among the voters in a district. In fact, one of the things that will
be litigated in Shaw, is whether, in the urban areas that make up
this district, a community of interest exists among the voters.
Ultimately, one may have to challenge Justice O'Connor's
fundamental idea that geographic neatness is what is most
important. It is archaic to equate geography with community of
interest in this day and age. That is, what does neatness have to
do at all with whether voters have similar interests in a district
which is either long, skinny, fat, round, square, a hexagon, or
who knows what, in shape? Given modem communication, there
are a lot of things that go into community of interest that have
absolutely nothing to do with geography. On a parting note, I
two districts at issue. Id. The Shaw majority recalled Justice Stevens'
concurring opinion in Karcher v. Daggett, where Justice Stevens suggested that
"'one need not use Justice Stewart's classic definition of obscenity - 'I know it
when I see it' - as an ultimate standard for judging the constitutionality of a
gerrymander to recognize that dramatically irregular shapes may have
sufficient probative force to call for an explanation.'" Id. at 2827. (quoting
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 755 (1983)). Finding "that reapportionment
is one area in which appearances do matter," Justice O'Connor stated in her
opinion that "[a] reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals
who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by
geographical and political boundaries .... bears an uncomfortable
resemblance to political apartheid." Id.
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would like you to consider that my former colleague, Professor
Lani Guinier has suggested alternative remedies to basing
electoral systems on districts.48
If I have time later today, I will talk in greater detail about
devices like limited voting and preferential voting. Where nine
city councilmen are to be elected, for example, such devices
allow every voter to get nine votes that can be used to vote for
nine different people, or for one person. 49 These methods allow
people to develop their own coalitions, and likewise help to avoid
artificial division by race, which Professor Guinier has said, may
not be the best thing to do. Alternatives exist that can be used to
further the goal of the Voting Rights Act, to allow everyone a
fair opportunity to elect persons of their choice, without running
into what seems to be the new constitutional right to "feel nice,"
and to have what is called a "color-blind society." Thank you.
48. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act
and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1077, 1136-37
(1989) (proposing proportionate interest representation as a different approach
to the reform of voting rights mainly for remedial purposes).
49. Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious
Districting: A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 "lEx. L. REV. 1589 (1993).
In this article, Professor Guinier stated:
I use the term 'one-vote, one value' to describe the principle... that as
many votes as possible should count in the election of representatives.
One-vote, one value is realized when everyone's vote counts for
someone's election. The only system with the potential to realize this
principle for all voters is one in which the unit of representation is
political rather than regional, and the aggregating rule is proportionality
rather than winner-take-all .... Cumulative voting, can approximate
the one-vote, one-value principle by minimizing the problem of wasted
votes .... [Under this system,] each vote has an equal worth
independent of decisions made by those who drew district lines. Votes
are allocated. . . by the voters themselves... Candidates are elected
in proportion to the intensity of their political support within the
electorate itself rather than as a result of decisions made by incumbent
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Mr. Michael A. Carvin, Esq.:
Thank you. I think the debate we are having today, which is
obviously very much in play these days on the proper
interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, is the debate that has
been played out in a number of areas of civil rights laws.
Namely, it is the question of how do you balance the rights of
minorities that have been traditionally discriminated against
versus those of non-minorities? Some people phrase that debate
as whether we are guaranteeing a system of equal opportunity, 50
or whether we are focusing more on equality of results. 5 1 In the
voting context, are we seeking to assure proportional
representation or a system of fair procedures? Should these
results be accomplished through racially preferential treatment to
traditionally disadvantaged minorities, as Mr. Ralston mentioned,
or through a color-blind approach of nondiscrimination?
I think this debate has taken on special urgency in the voting
rights context because, even more so than in other areas of
affirmative action, there is a tremendous amount of confusion and
evolution occurring in this area. 52 I do not want to begin the
50. See Note, Reconciling the Right to Vote with the Voting Rights Act, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1810, 1816 (1992) ("Under the Voting Rights Act, courts
and the Department of Justice now have begun to require that districting plans
afford groups an equal opportunity to participate effectively, through the use of
safe districting."); Laughlin McDonald, The Voting Rights Act and Vote
Dilution, 19 GA. L. REV. 459, 468 (1985) (book review) ("Majority black
voting districts... merely provide the equal opportunity for black office
holding, a right that section 2 makes explicit.").
51. See Michel Rosenfeld, Affirmative Action, Justice, and Equalities: A
Philosophical and Constitutional Appraisal, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 882 (1985). The
author stated that under the Voting Rights Act individuals are given "one and
no more than one vote, thus leading to equality of results." Id. at 884; Paul
Finkelman, The Color of Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 937, 943 (1993) (book
review) ("[A]ffirmative action programs are constitutional because they set the
stage for an equality of results, rather than an equality of process.").
52. See ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 6 (1987) ("The myth of moral
simplicity has largely insulated the voting rights issue from debate, yet perhaps
no other affirmative action question is more significant."); William N.
Eskridge Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil
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debate by agreeing with Mr. Ralston, but it is true that there is an
enormous amount of confusion in this area. State and local
governments, who are attempting to engage in even-handed
redistricting, are confronted with a real dilemma in trying to
reconcile the various Supreme Court pronouncements that have
come down. 53 I will briefly outline that dilemma for you in some
detail, and then respond to Mr. Ralston, in terms of why I think
Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 674 (1991) (discussing the confusion and
bewilderment in the voting rights area); Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics:
The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV.
1643, 1681 (1993) (stating that the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act
coupled with Gingles indicate the trend toward the evolution of a clearly
focused empirical test of vote dilution); Allen J. Lichtman & J. Gerald Hebert,
The Voting Rights Act and the Politics of Redistricting: Changing Boundaries,
Changing Voices, America's Political Future, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (discussing
how the Supreme Court's misconstruction of the 'results test' has sown
confusion in the literature and the courts).
53. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993) (holding that
white voters could challenge irregularly-shaped majority-black congressional
districts as unconstitutional); Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1156
(1993) (holding state legislatures may create super-majority districts in an
effort to enhance minority representation without being required to prove a
past violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act); Growe v. Emison 113 S.
Ct. 1075, 1085 (1993) (holding that criteria established in Gingles applies in
assessing validity of an allegation of minority vote fragmentation in the
drawing of single member districts under the vote dilution provisions of section
2 of the Voting Rights Act); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)
(establishing three preconditions to a vote-dilution claim); Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U.S. 613 (1982) (at-large elections in Burke County Georgia
unconstitutionally diluted the vote of minority residents); Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (holding that in order to establish a Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection claim, plaintiff would have to prove an invidious
purpose "to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic
minorities"); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (Texas legislative
redistricting case). The Supreme Court held that in order to successfully
challenge a state's districting plan, minority plaintiffs would have to show that
the plan did not give them an equal opportunity to dominate and elect
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the way the Court seems to push the envelope in Shanv v. Reno5 4
is a step in the right direction.
I think the 1982 amendments to section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act were the most important development in the voting rights
area.55 That section applies not only to just southern
jurisdictions, but to all jurisdictions throughout the United States.
The essential command of section 2 was to direct courts to
analyze minority vote dilution claims without regard to what the
individual legislators' motives were in enacting voting
practices. 5 6 According to section 2, we must focus more on the
results. Even if the motives are pure, if the result is to deny
minorities a fair opportunity to participate in the political and
electoral process, the law should be struck down.57
54. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). The Court stated that "a plaintiff challenging
a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim
by alleging that the legislation... rationally cannot be understood as anything
other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of
race." Id. at 2828. The Supreme Court held that white voters may challenge,
on equal protection grounds, state legislative plans that create districts designed
to elect minority congressional representatives. Id.
55. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1973(b) (1988)). Section 2 establishes that a violation of the right of
any citizen to vote occurs if "it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the state or political subdivision are not equally open
to participation by members of a protected class of citizens." Id.
56. Congress amended section 2 of the Act to clarify that discriminatory
intent was not a necessary element of a minority vote dilution claim rather,
proof of discriminatory result is now sufficient. This test, which was taken
from White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) defines the violation as a
denial of equal opportunity to "participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). See Andrew P. Miller
& Mark A. Packman, Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: What is the
Intent of the Results Test?, 36 EMORY L.J. 1, 74 (1987). The authors claimed
that under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, "Congress meant to enable
plaintiffs to prevail on legitimate claims of dilution in the absence of direct
evidence of discriminatory motive." Id.
57. See April D. Dulaney, A Judicial Exception for Judicial Elections: "A
Burning Scar on the Flesh of the Voting Rights Act," 65 TUL. L. REv. 1223,
1226 n.20 (1991). The "results" test removes the difficult burden of proving
discriminatory purposes and the court looks to objective factors behind election
scheme. 1d.; see also Note, To Infer or Not to Infer a Discriminatory Purpose:
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Now, I think the current debate focuses on what constitutes a
fair result in this situation. During the enactment of the Voting
Rights Act, all civil rights groups, and all the sponsors of the
legislation, assured their colleagues and Congress that such
enactment would not result in any sort of mandate for
proportional representation or race-conscious gerrymandering 58
of districts. 59 This is similar to Hubert Humphrey and the
sponsors of the Civil Rights Act, who had assured those who
were suspicious of that Act that it could not permit, and certainly
could not require, any use of racial quotas or preferential
treatment in the employment and educational contexts. 60 But, just
Rethinking Equal Protection Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 334, 345 (1986)
("In rejecting the purpose standard, Congress substituted a "results" test that
considers whether, based on the "totality of the circumstances," the right of
minority voters to participate equally in the political process and to elect
candidates of their choice has been violated.").
58. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 687 (6th ed. 1990). "Gerrymander" is
defined as:
a name given to the process of dividing a state or other territory into the
authorized civil or political divisions, but with such a geographical
arrangement as to accomplish an ulterior or unlawful purpose, as for
instance, to secure a majority for a given political party in districts
where the result would be otherwise if they were divided according to
obvious natural lines.
Id.
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). Incorporated into the statute, it states
that "[t]he extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to
office" is relevant, "provided [t]hat nothing in this section establishes a right to
have a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population." Id.; see also Note, At-Large Elections and Vote Dilution: An
Empirical Study, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1221, 1230 (1986) (discussing how
section 1973(b) was added to the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to disclaim any
notion of proportional representation).
60. See Kingley R. Brown, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A " Quote Bill,"
a Codification of Griggs, A Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the
Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 287 (1993) (citing 110 CONG. REc. 11,848
(1964)). Senator Humphrey stated that :
[T]itle VII does not provide that any preferential treatment in
employment shall be given to Negroes or to any other persons or
groups. It does not provide that any quota systems may be established to
maintain racial balance in employment. In fact the title would prohibit
preferential treatment for any particular group, and any minority group
[Vol 10
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as those laws have indeed resulted in mandatory affirmative
action and racially preferential treatment in the employment and
education areas, 6 1 I think section 2 has come to mean some sort
of race-conscious line drawing which guarantees enclaves of
minority voting power. The first step in this process was the
Thornburg v. Gingles62 case. In Gingles, the Court dealt with an
at-large system in North Carolina. That is a system where
everybody in the county or the city can vote for all members of
the county commission or city council. You do not have any sub-
units or single-member districts, where you know a particular
representative will run. If you have five members of the city
council, every voter in the city can vote for all five members.
For example, if you had a 20% representation of blacks in a
southern jurisdiction, the 80% white majority would not elect
black representatives who are running at large. So, the Gingles
Court essentially said that if you have a situation in which
racially polarized voting exists, and it is possible to create a
compact single member district in which one of those districts
would be permitted to file a complaint of discriminatory employment
practices.
Id. at 296.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 170 (1987) (stating
that race-conscious relief was justified in order to remedy discriminatory hiring
and promotional practices); Sheet Metal Workers v. E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421,
476 (1986) (holding that affirmative action programs to remedy employer's
"pervasive and egregious discrimination" were proper and did not violate
either Title VII or the Constitution).
62. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). The Court established three pre-conditions to a
vote-dilution claim:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in
a single-member district ... Second, the minority group must be able
to show that it is politically cohesive .... Third, the minority must be
able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it-in the absence of special circumstances... usually to defeat
the minority's preferred candidate.
Id. at 50-51. The Gingles Court held that vote dilution was shown only if,
under the "totality of the circumstances," the challenged electoral mechanisms
result in unequal access to the electoral process. Id. at 79.
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would be a majority-black district, you are, in essence, required
to create that district. 63
The question that the Court has not answered, and may well
answer this Term, is what happens in the single-member
redistricting context. 64 After each census, the state has to redraw
all of its state legislative and congressional lines and devise a
plan that creates the districts from which the state legislatures and
congressmen will run.65 If we draw these districts without regard
to race, it could create squares or nice compact districts which
would preserve political subdivisions and county lines. For
example, if you do not want to break the county line between
Nassau and Queens, that may have the result of creating a
number of districts where Hispanic or black voters would
constitute, say 40% of the district. That would result in less
minority-majority districts than if you used your racial census
data to draw long, skinny districts that essentially focus on
picking up Hispanic and black voters in different areas with the
avowed intent and effect of creating a district where minorities
are the majority of the population in order for them to elect
representatives of their choice.
63. See Smart Taylor, Jr., Electing By Race, 13 AM. LAW. 50, 54 (1991).
The author stated that Gingles can be interpreted as holding that "as many
majority-minority districts as possible must be drawn wherever racial bloc
voting persists.. . ." Id.
64. See Holder v. Hall, 955 F.2d. 1563 (lth Cir. 1992), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 1382 (1993). "[The issues are whether a single commissioner form
of county government is subject to a vote dilution challenge under section 2 of
the statute and whether federal courts have authority to order creation of a 5-
member commission as a remedy...." Id. at 1382; Johnson v. De Grandy,
794 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Fla. 1992), cert. granted, 62 U.S.L.W. 3261 (U.S.
Oct. 12, 1993) (No. 92-519, 92-593, and 92-767). The issues involved a battle
between predominantly Republican Hispanic voters and largely Democratic
blacks over redistricted seats in the Florida Senate and House of
Representatives from Miami and nearby areas. Id. at 1079.
65. The States retain the power to prescribe voter qualifications and
electoral systems under the Tenth Amendment. See, e.g., Joseph F.
Zimmerman, The Federal Voting Rights Act and Alternative Election Systems,
19 WM & MARY L. REv. 621, 621-40 (1978) (discussing rights of states to
determine their own electoral systems).
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That is the kind of dilemma that somebody trying to draw up a
redistricting plan faces. Do we adhere to traditional redistricting
principles without regard to race, or should we inject a measure
of race-consciousness into the way we have drawn our districts?
Clearly, the experience in every state with any kind of substantial
minority population during the 1990 redistricting was the latter
situation.66 In a majority of states, line drawers would sit down
at their computers, draw the minority districts and figure out how
to connect pockets of minority voters just as they did in North
Carolina. That district ran hundreds of miles down a federal
highway to connect people from entirely different jurisdictions
for the sole purpose of creating a majority-minority district. 67
After Shaw invalidated that district, such line-drawing has
created a dilemma. On the one hand, the Court seems to have
said in Gingles, that you have to maximize minority voting
strength to avoid violating the rights of minority voters, 68 but on
the other hand the Court tells us that if we do engage in that sort
of line drawing, that we are violating the rights of non-minority
voters who have been excluded from this district. Yet, Shaw is
not entirely clear. It is just like the pornography cases where the
Court says, "we'll know it when we see it"- when you cross this
66. See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1085 (1993). The
Court, in Growe, stated that federal courts should not interfere with
Minnesota's internal attempt to redistrict in light of the 1990 Census, and that
to sustain a claim under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act a plaintiff must
satisfy the Court's three-part test established by Gingles. Id.; Voinovich v.
Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1156 (1993). The Voinovich Court held that section 2
of the Voting Rights Act permits intentional manipulations of electoral districts
to get majority-minority districts only where a legislative body is acting to
remedy a prior section 2 violation. Id.
67. In Shaw, the North Carolina General Assembly had created a 160-mile
long district (Congressional District 12), winding through ten counties, which
linked the urban areas of Durham, Greensboro, Winston-Salem and Charlotte.
68. Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). The Court found that
historical discrimination in voting, coupled with recent and obviously limited
success of black politicians, and a multi-member districting plan that tended to
dilute the black vote, denied blacks their constitutionally protected right to
vote, and thereby participate politically. Id. at 80.
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line. 69 So, the impact of Shaw has not yet been developed
because, I think there are going to have to be subsequent cases in
terms of developing exactly when that line is crossed. 70
The other dilemma, is that, on the one hand, you are seemingly
requiring line drawers to engage in this race-conscious line
drawing, and on the other hand, you are stating that they are
violating the Constitution if they do so. There are some cases
now pending Supreme Court review that have already been
argued, and I would like to just briefly touch on those. These are
the Florida redistricting cases. 71 Without getting into a lot of
detail, the federal court struck down Florida's state legislative
redistricting plan on essentially the same grounds that we have
been talking about; that it was possible to create two more
districts in the state house that would be minority controlled, and
one more district in the state senate that was minority
controlled. 72 Pursuant to that analysis, the plaintiff said this
violates section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.73 Obviously, it is
69. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (Justice Stewart's famous phrase depicting the Supreme Court's
frustration in assigning any precise meaning to the concept of unprotected
pornography). In Shaw, Justice O'Connor mentions that "one need not use
Justice Stewart's classic definition of obscenity -- 'I know it when I see it' -- as
an ultimate standard for judging the constitutionality of a gerrymander to
recognize that dramatically irregular shapes may have sufficient probative
force to call for an explanation." [citations omitted] Shaw, 113 U.S. at 2827.
70. Richard G. Niemi & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre
Districts, " and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election - District Appearances After
Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483, 485 (1993) ("Shaw provides no criteria
to guide reapportionment bodies or courts in judging when this line has been
crossed.").
71. The Court agreed this Term to address challenges to the redistricting
of Florida's single member and senate districts. 62 U.S.L.W. 3261 (U.S. Oct.
12, 1993) (summarizing the dispute in Johnson v. De Grandy, No. 92-519
prob. juris. noted, 113 S. Ct. 2437 (1993)). This case was argued before the
Supreme Court on the first day of the 1993-94 Term. Id.
72. See 62 U.S.L.W. at 3261-63. "The legislature had drawn district lines
so that each of three senate districts was likely to elect an Hispanic senator and
two other districts were likely to elect black candidates. Id. The [district] court
found, however, that each group was sufficiently numerous and geographically
compact to justify an additional senate district." Id. at 3267.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
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difficult to predict how the Supreme Court is going to react to a
case just by viewing the argument. But, in the argument for the
Florida redistricting case, the Court expressed a tremendous
amount of skepticism about the fact that section 2 did indeed
mandate that kind of maximization of the most minority-majority
districts that could be created. 74 Even Justice Ginsburg seemed to
be troubled by this notion, particularly since Florida is a state
where there are tremendous political differences between the
Hispanic voters, which is one of the minorities affected by this
plan.75 In Tampa, Hispanics are traditionally Democratic voters.
In Miami, I think there are a lot of Hispanic voters who
traditionally vote Republican, so the Court was skeptical of the
notion that even in those circumstances, you have to carve out
these districts for the sole purpose of creating these minority-
majority districts. So, if I had to predict, which is always a tricky
proposition on the basis of an argument, I would think that the
Court would be heading in a direction to ease the pressure of
creating these minority-majority districts, in order to lessen the
dilemma that Shaw created. On the one hand, the Court is forcing
the creation of these districts, on the other hand, it is saying that
those districts might violate the Constitution. 76
74. See 62 U.S.L.W. at 3263. Justice Scalia questioned the attorney
representing Florida as to the definition of the term "maximization," and
Justice Kennedy continued this line of inquiry by probing whether such a
concept would trigger a section 2 or an equal protection claim. Id.
75. Id. While the Assistant to the Solicitor General argued that there was
evidence showing cohesiveness amongst Florida's Hispanic voters, Chief
Justice Rehnquist interjected that the lower court had apparently found
disparities between Cuban and non-Cuban Hispanic voters within the county in
question itself. Id. Justice Ginsburg continued the line of questioning with
inquiries as to what defines cohesive voting, partisan voting, or race based
voting, etc. Id.
76. See Niemi & Pildes, supra note 70, at 484. In their introductory
remarks, the authors of this article suggest that Shaw v. Reno provides an outer
boundary of geographical abnormality which will be tolerated by the Supreme
Court in the name of remedying racial inequality in the electoral process
through creation of majority-minority districts. Id at 485. The dilemma created
by such limitation thus seems to be that the Voting Rights Act mandates that
legislatures attempt, and courts enforce means which would afford minority
voters meaningful opportunity to elect representatives of their choice, free
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Whatever the results, whether I am right or wrong in that
prediction, I will turn to what I think is the right answer in terms
of how people should proceed with redistricting in this situation.
In my view, the right answer was given in Shaw. I think the
Constitution, and the Voting Rights Act, guarantee minority
voters equal access to the political and democratic process, but it
does not, and certainly should not, guarantee minority voters
preferential treatment where the traditional rules and policies of
voting and redistricting practices are thrown out so that you are
guaranteed a certain level of success by minority voters. Minority
voters should not be guaranteed preferential treatment in the
redistricting process where the state legislature engages in
gerrymandering that is designed to immunize minority candidates
from the traditional ups and downs in the democratic process.
For example, in the redistricting context, I certainly would not
object to the degree of race-consciousness permissible under
Shaw. For example, assume you have a traditional black
community in one alternative which would fragment, by drawing
a district line right through it, and you have an equally legitimate
alternative which tries to preserve that community. I would think
that would be acceptable, and certainly not inconsistent with the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment 77 if you were to choose
the better alternative.
But, what I do object to, is subordination of all traditional
redistricting principles, preservation of political boundaries, the
making of compact districts, and combining communities of
interest. In New York, for example, Brooklyn Jewish
communities of interest were obviously subordinated and split
asunder in order to accomplish what would seem to be the only
from voter dilution which frustrates such an effort. Id. However, by holding
that there are limitations placed on such seemingly well-intentioned efforts,
Shaw v. Reno confuses those trying to adhere to the law because there is now a
line beyond which, such efforts as mandated by statute, are not only
discouraged but rather found to be constitutionally impermissible. Id. at 484-
85.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause provides
that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id.
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purpose of redistricting throughout the country, which was to
guarantee a certain proportion of minority seats, regardless of the
legitimate state objectives that were being undermined. I think
anyone who tells you that that is not what was going on
throughout the Country is not telling you the truth. You do not
have to take my word for it. Look at the maps. North Carolina is
a good example. This district extended over hundreds of miles
and connected people that have had no contact in the past. The
North Carolina example was not the exception, rather, it was the
rule. That kind of subordination to one, or even to a number of
identified groups - in the political process, cannot be squared
with traditional notions of a democracy or with the command of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mr. Ralston questions what the harm is to the non-minorities? I
recognize the harm in this affirmative action context is less
tangible than a quota which excludes you from a promotion in
employment, 78 or from an admission to a medical school.
79
Under those circumstances, the non-minorities have been denied
a tangible benefit that they have earned on the merit, and the
deprivation to them is great. But, I do not think he is entirely
serious when he suggests that they can vote, so it is really not a
problem. According to Mr. Ralston, they can show up at the
polls and vote, so how can they complain about whether or not
their vote is effective? If you really believe that, I think you have
to say that the result in the famous case of Gomillion v.
78. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979). The Court held that the affirmative action plan fell within the
provisions of Title VII, because the plan was designed to eliminate racial
imbalance in the traditionally segregated employment area. Id. at 209. The
Court reasoned that the plan did not hinder the interest of white employees
with regard to promotions, because it did not require the discharge of white
employees in order to hire black employees. Id. at 208.
79. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
The Bakke Court affirmed the invalidation of special admissions program
which was designed to admit a certain number of minority students to the
medical school of the University of California at Davis. Id. at 320. The school
could not show that "but for the existence of its unlawful special admissions




Ralston and Carvin: Voting Rights Debate
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TOURO LAW REVIEW
Lightfoot,80 was wrong or that the gerrymandering practices that
went on throughout the South in past years were acceptable,
because, at least in some circumstances, the black voters, were
allowed to vote. Their complaint was not that they could not cast
their vote, but that they had been gerrymandered into a district
where their vote had been rendered less effective solely because
of the color of their skin. To say that there is no real harm, is
kind of silly. I think it would mean that once you have achieved
chief proportional representation, legislators could embark on a
deliberate program of gerrymandering of all of the black
communities in the United States. Again, I suspect that is a result
that Mr. Ralston would not accept. But, apart from that tangible
harm, I really think that the harm to the democratic and political
process, while less tangible, is nonetheless important to people
who care about the way we are going to engage in racial politics
in the future, and whether racial politics are going to subordinate
other concerns. I do not want to bore you by reading to you the
entire excerpts from Shaw, but I think these concerns were very
well stated by Justice O'Connor in that opinion. So I will read
you some of her comments about the harms that do result from
this kind of redistricting. She said that these districts, like the
district in North Carolina, have "an uncomfortable resemblance
to political apartheid. [They] reinforce ... the perception that
members of the same racial group-regardless of their age,
education, economic status, or the community in which they live
- think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer
the same candidates at the polls."81 Furthermore, she stated that
in a racially gerrymandered district,
elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary
obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather
than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether antiethical
80. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). The Court invalidated and held unconstitutional
a Tuskegee, Alabama districting plan that excluded black voters from city
limits, by drawing the city limits as "an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure"
municipal boundary line. Id at 340. The Court concluded that the "unlawful
segregation of races of citizens" into different voting districts was cognizable
under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 349.
81. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
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to our system of representative democracy.... Racial
gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us
into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further
from the goal of political system in which race no longer matters
- a goal... to which [this] Nation continues to aspire. 82
In other words, this extreme interpretation of the Voting Rights
Act, in my view, diminishes the transcendent ideal of Martin
Luther King Jr. and others of equal treatment, without regard to
race. It turns it into another fairly raw system of interest group
politicians, and it creates a system of racial politics that
guarantees and reinforces racially polarized voting and
representation. A minority office holder, who has achieved that
office in a system that sets aside certain districts for voters of his
race, is dependent on that system for his survival. So, he has no
political incentive to reach out to other groups or to engage in a
sort of traditional coalition building that is the hallmark of
American politics and where voters could come to perceive that
this person does indeed represent all of this constituency. What
would be the perception of the non-minority voters in the districts
that have been created this way? They would obviously perceive
that the minority office holder is a representative of another
group which is defined by race. This would force, for the first
time, that non-minority, to react, and to vote along racial lines,
and say that this person does not represent me. Why? Because he
is of a different race and he is appealing through a federally-
imposed system to a constituency of his own race. In my view,
that has got to contribute to the permanent balkinization of
American politics.
The other point I would like to make is that there is no end
point to this system. Mr. Ralston will not be able to identify
when this system will come to an end. This is not a temporary
remedial measure designed to correct identified discrimination. It
will exist as long as racially polarized voting will exist. It will
exist in the next census I suspect, and it will exist in my
grandchildren's elections. There is simply no end point in sight.
82. Id. at 2832.
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I would like to make two final points. The other thing that
should bother you about this system is that it depends on ongoing
segregation. It absolutely depends on it. This is the only civil
rights policy that is not designed to mix the races together to
create an integrated group. It insists, or rather, mandates that you
separate the races. It insists that you separate black voters from
white and Hispanic voters, so they can each have their own
district, and is totally dependent on this ongoing segregation. If
we reach a point in society where Hispanics and blacks achieve
pure residential integration, where they are sprinkled throughout
the City of New York, then there will be absolutely no way to
create this majority-minority district. There are no black or
minority neighborhoods that you can carve out and say, here is
our district. As a result, you create a tremendous disincentive
among minority political leadership to achieve that integration,
and to reach out as representatives of the entire community, and
you create a tremendous incentive for them to continue to appeal
to a narrowly defined constituency that is segregated where it
lives.
Finally, in multi-cultural and ethnic societies like New York
City, it is particularly problematic, because it does not just pit
minority against non-minority. It pits minorities against each
other. You saw this in the congressional and state legislative
redistricting in New York where the major conflicts were not
between Republicans and Democrats, or whites and minorities,
but between Hispanic and black interest groups. So, in my view,
Shaw was clearly a step in the right direction. I think the Court
will, and certainly should help us go further in that direction.
Thank you.
Mr. Charles Stephen Ralston, Esq.:
I think the problem with many things Mr. Carvin says, as well
as the problem with the decision in Shaw v. Reno, is that there is
a certain amount of non-reality to it. Courts, in Voting Rights
Act cases, have held that these types of districts can be drawn,
based on a demonstration of a number of factors. Number one,
the minority group is, in fact, politically cohesive. That is, the
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notion that a minority group, be it African-American or
Hispanic, votes together, is not a notion out of the blue, but is
rather a demonstrated fact. An example is easily seen if you look
at voting patterns in the South, where African-Americans
overwhelmingly vote Democrat, and the Republican party is
disproportionately white.
The second factor, which is of equal importance, is the
demonstrated existence of racially, polarized voting. 83 Very
simply and starkly, such voting means that whites will not vote
for a black or a Hispanic candidate. If a minority is submerged,
one way or another, into a district where whites have the
operative majority, the minority cannot build coalitions, because
white voters will not coalesce with them. 84 It is very nice to
think or hope that people would not vote with race in mind, but
unfortunately, in these cases, and in election after election,
racially-polarized voting has been demonstrated to be true. The
remedies that are sought are ways to ensure that minority
communities are not simply submerged in a predominant culture
which will not respond to them, and which will not elect people
83. See Thornberg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). The Court held "it
cannot be said that the section of a multimember electoral structure thwarts
distinctive minority group interests" unless there is proof of polarized voting.
Id. at 51. The reason for looking at the "existence of racially polarized voting
is twofold: to ascertain whether minority group members constitute a
politically cohesive unit and to determine whether whites vote... as a
bloc... to defeat the minority's preferred candidates." Id. at 56. Gingles
established a three-part test which made polarized voting the real measure of
vote dilution: 1) minority voters must prove that they are a large and
geographically compact group to indicate a minority-dominated single-member
district, 2) the minority community must be "Politically cohesive" and 3) they
must show that a pattern of bloc voting by the majority has led to the defeat of
minority-supported candidates. d. at 50-51.
84. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process:
The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1833
(1992). Establishing the final two requirements of the Gingles three-part test
demonstrates that racial polarization exists because black and white voters vote
for different candidates. Id. at 1852. If racial polarization is evident, then the
minority voters have established that "submergence in a white multi-member
district impedes its ability to elect its chosen representatives." Id. at 1852-53
(quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51).
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of that minority, no matter what their qualifications are, but
rather that minority voters have a fair opportunity to elect
representatives of their choice.
This still would not mean that minority voters have
proportional representation. In North Carolina, for example,
whites still have more representatives than their proportion in the
population, but it does mean that there is an opportunity for
people who have been excluded from the political process. And
one must remember, that the Voting Rights Act is less than thirty
years old. I started working in this field before it was passed, and
in areas where the Voting Rights Act is most important, there
existed the total and systematic exclusion of blacks from voting in
the political process. One does not deal with the harm simply by
saying that people can vote. The Voting Rights Act allowed, not
only the registration of African Americans in the South, but also,
for the first time, allowed them to actually vote, without being
subjected to violence, death, or loss of jobs.
However, there is another aspect to voting, and that is the
notion of vote dilution, that people can vote, but their vote does
not mean anything if you have a system which consistently
submerges their vote in a dominant majority vote, that does not
pay any attention to them. 85 It is that kind of harm that I do not
see shown in Shaw v. Reno, because the fact is that, in Shaw, the
white voters were able to elect a significant number of whites to
the congressional delegation. And, as the Supreme Court pointed
out, they did not claim vote dilution. 86 They did not claim that
their right to vote had been diluted by the system. So, the harm
85. Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative
Delegations, Racial Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE L.J. 105
(1992). The notion of vote dilution examines the election structure and looks to
the ability of minority voters to elect candidates. Id. at 137. Three possible
types of vote dilution: 1) "multimember district submergence," 2) "the use of
multimember districts to impair the ability of a minority group to influence
elections .... and 3) "splitting a concentration of minority voters between two
or more districts so that the group constituted a majority in neither district."
Id. at 145 (citing Gingles 478 U.S. at 46-47 n.12).
86. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. Appellants did not claim that the
redistricting plan "diluted white voting strength." Id.
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they claim to have suffered is far different than that demonstrated
in Gomillion v. Lightoot.87 That case involved one of the few
places in Alabama where blacks were even allowed to vote. In
Gomillion, the state legislature had deliberately redrawn the
district to exclude them, and basically, completely wiped out any
ability they had to govern. 88 I found it almost offensive for the
Supreme Court to equate what occurred in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, to what the North Carolina legislature did in Shaw.
These two cases are simply not comparable at all, and it is a
diminution of the Voting Rights Act to make that comparison.
I think we have to remember a couple of things. As Mr. Carvin
acknowledged, the issue is neither like that in affirmative action
cases, nor is it like that in Croson. In affirmative action cases,
the problem is that one person is going to get a job, and another
person will not. What is at issue here, and what will ultimately
be at issue if the Supreme Court decides to deal with the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, is not the Equal
Protection Clause at all. Since the Voting Rights Act was passed
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, 89 and if it is consistent with
the Fifteenth Amendment, then it cannot be invalid under the
Fourteenth Amendment, because the Fifteenth Amendment was
passed after the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifteenth
87. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). In Gonillion, Black voters sued, claiming that
the city redistricting plan was unconstitutional because it deprived them of their
right to vote in municipal elections on account of their race. Id. at 340.
88. Id. at 341. According to the complaint, the act in question transformed
the City of Tuskegee from a square-shaped city, "into a strangely irregular
twenty-eight-sided figure. .. ." Id. Additionally, the complaint also charged
that:
it]he essential inevitable effect of this redefinition of Tuskegee's
boundaries is to remove from the city all save only four or five of its
400 Negro voters while not removing a single white voter or resident.
The result of the Act is to discriminatorily deprive the Negro petitioners
of the benefits of residence in Tuskegee, including, inter alia, the right
to vote in municipal elections.
Id.
89. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
(holding that a private, volunteer affirmative action plan did not violate Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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Amendment provides that the rights of citizens of the United
States to vote, shall not be denied or abridged on account of race,
color or previous condition of servitude, and that Congress has
been given the authority to pass legislation that it believes will
enforce that provision.9o In the Voting Rights Act, Congress
made the decision, which was amply supported by history and the
evidence before it, that to submerge minority votes in a majority
white system, where white voters would simply not vote for a
minority candidate, and minority votes were rendered ineffective
and meaningless, is, in fact, equal to the abridgment of the
minority voters' right to vote. 91
I would just like to leave you with this one thought: That
alternative remedies exist to carving up states into districts on a
strictly racial basis, and such remedies have been written about
extensively.92 There is an organization called the Center for
Voting and Democracy in Washington, D.C. Those of you who
are involved directly in dealing with this problem might want to
contact this organization. Because many of the problems come
from the single-district, winner-take-all system, this organization
has suggested alternative ways for voting to get away from the
district, winner-take-all system. Although the United States has
held on to this system for historic reasons, most Western
democracies have abandoned the two party, you-win-fifty-one-
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. The Fifteenth Amendment states: "The
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.";
see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) (holding that
Fifteenth Amendment's declaration is self-executing).
91. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). The Court stated that
"[t]he minority's voting power in a multimember district is particularly diluted
when bloc voting occurs and ballots are cast along strict majority-minority
lines." Id. at 616; White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (upholding
district court's finding that one-person-one-vote plan unconstitutionally diluted
voting strength of minorities); Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex
1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973). "The majority system tends to strengthen the majority's ability to
submerge a political or racial minority in a multi-member district." Id. at 775.
92. See Guinier, supra note 49.
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percent-of-the-vote-you-get-everything system, and have gone to
other forms of electing officials. 93
Such alternate electoral systems work particularly well for city
councils and small governmental units. In Alabama, for example,
as a result of voting rights litigation, a number of jurisdictions
have switched to an alternate system. For the first time in a
hundred years, minority voters have been able to elect
representatives because they were able to coalesce, and pool their
votes themselves, without someone else saying, "you are
minority, so you belong over here." As a result, people could
develop their own coalitions, elect people of their choice and not
be excluded entirely, due to the fact that the majority will simply
never vote for them. Thank you.
Mr. Michael A. Carvin, Esq.:
In any discussion of affirmative action, the people who oppose
affirmative action are always accused of not being realistic about
the current state of American society, that their position is based
on the Pollyannaish view that discrimination will somehow
wither away. Of course, that is not the premise of my position. I
know discrimination continues to exist in American society. It is
based on the much simpler proposition that two wrongs do not
make a right. You do not correct discrimination on the basis of
immutable characteristics, such as race and gender, by visiting
precisely the same evil on other individuals, who never benefited
from, nor engaged in the prior evil. So, I think we should put
that suggestion aside. Mr. Ralston seemed to concede that, yes,
there was a harm in terms of not being able to elect
representatives of choice, but it should not be a problem to these
white voters in North Carolina, because, after all, significant
numbers of people of the same race in other parts of the state, are
presumably going to be representing their interest, even if it is
not their own representative. I can only repeat my question from
93. See Dillard v. Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 870 (N.D.
Ala. 1988) (holding that federal law does not prohibit a cumulative voting
system which enables black voters to cumulate votes).
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before. Would that be a satisfactory answer to a minority voter
who had suffered intentional gerrymandering in his district?
There are indeed a lot of alternative remedies that go beyond
redrawing single member districts. All of them scare me a lot
more than what has been going on so far. Lani Guinier has
identified a lot of them. Her most notable alternative remedy is
one in which minority legislators, once elected, would have a
veto power in the legislature over any issue that was identified as
important to minority voters. 94 You would need some kind of
super-majority for welfare, crime or whatever else some court
decided was important to minority voters. The big push in the
Voting Rights Act is not simply to empower minority voters to
elect a representative of that choice, but rather to empower
minority representatives, once they are in the legislature to play
by different rules than would any other legislator. They are to be
given more votes or more power on issues that are important to
them than other legislators have. I do agree that that is where the
Voting Rights Act is going. I think that sort of fundamental
assault on our democratic system is not guaranteed by our
Constitution or the Voting Rights Act.
To avoid being accused of speaking in hyperbole, I just want to
point to the other voting rights case that is currently pending in
the Supreme Court. The premise of this case is not only that you
need to redo the current system of electing your representative,
and to shift it in a way that ensures minority voters a certain
amount of power, but you have to redo the government structure
94. See Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political
Equality, 77 VA. L. REv. 1413 (1991) Lani Guinier proposes an interest
representation approach. According to Professor Guinier, this approach
"emphasizes the importance of voter autonomy divorced from involuntary,
fixed territorial constituencies. Using voter patterns, it measures as a
politically cohesive group those voters who identify themselves with each other
based on their own evaluation of their shared interests. As a statutory approach
to vote dilution, interest representation measures the impact of electoral or
voting rules on the legislative representation of self-identified minority voters'
interests." Id. at 1461-62.
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itself. In Holder v. Hall,95 the Eleventh Circuit dealt with a
single member county commissioner, where one person ran the
county, like a mayor or a governor of New York. 96 This system
had existed since the county had come into existence, and there
was no allegation that there was any kind of discriminatory
lineage to it. The minority plaintiffs claimed they could not elect
the county commissioner, but if you abolish that office and create
a five-person commission, they could elect one of those. 97 So,
the Eleventh Circuit said the Voting Rights Act not only requires
that you ensure that electoral patterns are designed in a certain
way, but you have to abolish a governmental office, and name as
many offices as are required for minority voters to be able to
elect their own commissioner. So, if one governor of New York
prevents minorities from electing a governor, and a five-person
commission is created to run the State of New York, presumably,
you would have to do that in order to ensure the proportional
representation.
We can debate the merits of proportional representation versus
winner-take-all. I do not know if the people in South America or
Italy think that necessarily giving every group in the particular
society a proportionate voice in the legislature, is a great thing.
But, my point, of course, is that it is a question for the
democratic process to decide what kind of representative
government you want. It is not the kind of thing that should be
dictated by courts, and certainly not dictated along racial lines.
Thank you.
Judge Leon D. Lazer:
Now, we are going to hear from Professor Shaw.
95. 955 F.2d. 1563 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1382
(1993) (holding that black voters established a violation of section 2 of the
voting act under the "totality of circumstances" test).
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Professor Gary M. Shaw:
Listening to this debate, it reminded me very much of reading
various Supreme Court decisions in which one opinion is written
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and the other opinion is written by
Justice Douglas. I sometimes wondered whether the two people
are talking about the same thing. Clearly they are, but I think
there are problems with both positions here, and the joy of my
role here is that I do not have to suggest answers. It seems to me
that much of the distinction between Mr. Ralston and Mr. Carvin
comes from the extent to which they view the Voting Rights Act
as remedial rather than as an implementing problem type of
policy.
Mr. Carvin, I guess I disagree with you to some extent when
you say we should have this color-blind ideal. Of course, we
should, but we cannot ignore the fact that the very choice of a
system has an effect on minority voting rights. The question
becomes, what kind of system, then, should be implemented,
given that there are several possible systems and given the fact
that there has been traditional discrimination and
disenfranchisement in the past?
I do not think we can say that we have already reached a point
where no remedial solution is appropriate. You may disagree
with what the remedial solution is, but I think I would be more
willing than you to give greater weight to the remedial solution,
which would perhaps be closer to Mr. Ralston's position.
On the other hand, Mr. Ralston, I think Mr. Carvin made an
excellent point in saying that you cannot simply say white votes
or white interests are fungible. In North Carolina, for example,
there will be differences in the interests of white voters between
the suburbs and the city, between Democrats and Republicans.
To say whites have 20 out of 22 seats, even under the new
proposal, and therefore, there is no injury, seems to me, to
ignore the differences in interests. White interests are not block
interests any more than minority interests are block interests, and
I do not think you can dispose of the concern of injury to white
voters by simply saying that they have 20 out of 22 seats.
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I would like to pose a question, for which I do not have an
answer, to both Mr. Carvin and Mr. Ralston. I think both of you
have recognized the idea that there are other minorities besides
African-Americans. Mr. Carvin mentioned, for example, Jewish
voters in Brooldyn. Regardless of the position that you take, and
your positions are obviously different, how do you deal with the
fact that there are several minorities that are entitled to, and
should have some degree of representation?
Judge Leon D. Lazer:
I will ask Mr. Carvin to answer first.
Mr. Michael A. Carvin, Esq.:
I will punt a little bit because my basic premise is this: This
should not be a zero sum game where you get a bunch of
competing ethnic groups trying to get a proportionate share of the
pie. I frankly do not know the answer. For example, if you can
only create an Hispanic or a black district, which particular
group has a greater claim to historical injustice? Certainly, I
would think African-Americans generally do, but I suppose you
could pick out the different regions of the countries where that
might not be true. I do not think the political power should
depend upon how strong a claim of historical discrimination a
particular group can make. It is an unfortunate by-product and I
would think that even Mr. Ralston would agree that one by-
product of creating ethnic conscious situations is that in a
multicultural environment, there may be winners and losers
between those various groups. It is an awfully difficult chore for
the Court to figure out which group it is.
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Mr. Charles Stephen Ralston, Esq.:
I would certainly agree that the existence of multi-cultural
groups presents a very difficult problem with regard to what kind
of remedy would be effective, and how much coalition you
should allow. 98 There is a separate issue based on what is called
"influence districts," where a number of minorities might have
influence over the result, but cannot necessarily control the
district. This problem has occurred in New York. 99 It has arisen
in Texas.100 It is also a very important issue in the Florida
cases.10 1 I again stress that in order to potentially deal with such
problems one day, we must think about remedies that do not
depend on drawing district lines, but which would rather,
through devices such as cumulative voting, allow people to
decide for themselves what their interests are, and with whom
they want to form coalitions.
Judge Leon D. Lazer:
Judge Pratt, would you like to comment?
Hon. George C. Pratt:
I would just like to comment on how surprised I was with the
Supreme Court's decision in Shaw. When the New York City
Council was reorganized, I was a member of the three-judge
98. See Angelo N. Ancheta and Kathryn K. Imahara, Multi-Ethnic Voting
Rights: Redefining Vote Dilution in Communities of Color, 27 U.S.F. L. REV.
815, 821 (1993) (stating that voting rights laws have to change in order to meet
problems posed when multi-ethnic groups in community bring claims).
99. Mirrione v. Anderson, 717 F.2d 743, 745 (1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1036 (1984) (stating that "absent invidious discrimination, voters... are
not entitled to be grouped together in a single election unit").
100. Seamen v. Upham, 536 F. Supp. 931 (E.D. Tex. 1982) (stating that
black voting strength was diluted when Texas created two minority influence
districts rather than one majority-black district), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 456 U.S. 37 (1982).
101. De Grandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076, 1085-86 (N.D. Fla.
1992). The court stated that creation of influence districts furthers "dilution of
minority voting strength .... ").
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panel that heard that redistricting plan. 102 The following year,
when New York City underwent congressional redistricting, I
was unlucky enough to be a member of that panel as well. 103 In
both cases, the issue was minority representation. To the best of
my recollection, in neither case, did any of the multiple parties
suggest that it was not the proper application of the Voting Rights
Act to design districts so as to enhance minority representation as
much as possible. Therefore, redistricting plans were developed.
No one criticized these plans on the basis that they were
unconstitutional. It just seemed to be established law throughout
the country; therefore, the voting rights schemes were accepted,
and worked fairly well. Then came the Supreme Court's decision
in Shaw, which concluded that such redistricting cannot be done
in extreme situations, such as that in North Carolina. It is almost
as if the Supreme Court has upset the apple cart, and we have to
turn it right side up.
Judge Leon D. Lazer:
Is there a question from the audience?
Audience Member:
The Supreme Court has applied the Voting Rights Act to
judicial elections. What effect do you think that will have on the
notion of "one man, one vote," and on the makeup of districts,
particularly in New York State?
102. See Daniel Wise, Residency Rules Lifted for Council Election, N.Y.
L.J., July 31, 1991, at 1 (discussing the three-judge panel's alteration of key
provisions of New York State election law which consisted of eliminating
existence residency requirements and reducing petitioning requirements in
order to make it easier to run in the New York City Council primary election).
103. See Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Educ. Fund v. Gantt, 796 F. Supp.
681 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that congressional redistricting
plan met constitutional and statutory requirements but would not take effect
unless the state redistricting plan failed to get preclearance from the United
States Department of Justice).
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Mr. Charles Stephen Ralston, Esq.:
I am not that familiar with the New York State situation.
However, we just filed a petition for certiorari in what is now,
League of Latin American Citizens v. Attorney General of Texas,
coming out of the Fifth Circuit, dealing with judicial elections.
This case is a follow-up on the HLA case 104 which held that
although the rule of "one person - one vote" does not apply to
judicial elections, the Voting Rights Act does. 105
Judge Leon D. Lazer:
Mr. Carvin, would you like to comment?
Mr. Michael A. Carvin, Esq.:
Yes, I have two points. The first point is: however you feel
about this sort of race-conscious line drawing, when you are
talking about elected representatives who are supposed to be
responsive to their constituency, you should be troubled by the
fact that such line-drawing is being applied to judges. 106 Judges
are not supposed to be responsive to any kind of political
concern. Simply, their role is to impartially judge the case in
front of them. At least in the northern states, my political opinion
is that this has been a good opportunity to end the at-large
election or apportionment of judges. That generally means
appointing or electing democratic judges. So, in the north,
Republican parties have used race-conscious line-drawing in such
104. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 111 S. Ct. 2376,
2380 (1991) (holding that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act requires election
of state trial judges to be in compliance); see also Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S.
Ct. 2354, 2368 (1991) (holding that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
encompasses state judicial elections).
105. Houston Lawyers'Ass'n, 11 S. Ct. at 2380.
106. See Magnolia Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Lee, 994 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1993)
In applying the Gingles factors to judicial elections, the court held that absent
evidence of legally significant white bloc voting the election of two black
judges was not a violation of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 1149.
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a way as to create single member districts, but not withstanding
my party affiliation, I do not like that very much.
Judge Leon D. Lazer:
Is there another question?
Audience Member:
The historical reason for the creation of North Carolina's
district is effectively due to the lack of judges' representation.
What would you recommend as a remedy?
Mr. Charles Stephen Ralston, Esq.:
Very quickly, in litigating Shaw v. Reno, in the district court,
which we are now in the process of doing, we are going to
demonstrate the history of the demographics of that area, and
why that "bizarre-looking" district is, in fact, responsive to both
the actual interests of the people in it, white and black alike, and
to the historical development of the demographics of that area of
the state.
Judge Leon D. Lazer:
Mr. Carvin, do you want to comment?
Mr. Michael A. Carvin, Esq.:
Very quickly, I think it is a mistake to equate the election of
minority candidates with the notion that any group has a certain
amount of political power. I do not accept the idea that in North
Carolina, a state where a few years ago a black person almost
won a senatorial race against Jesse Helms, 107 does not get
significant white crossover voting. Nor do I accept the notion that
liberal politicians are not otherwise responsive to the
communities' needs, in terms of creating situations where
107. The author is referring to Jesse Helms' successful 1990 Senate race in
North Carolina against Harvey Gantt.
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minority interests are represented. I am perfectly comfortable
with the notion of trying to preserve minority communities of
interest, and adopting legitimate redistricting alternatives.
However, I do object to making that the only criteria.
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